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Abstract 
This article considers the success of the two distinct construction industry payment 
legislative models operating in Australia – “East Coast” and “West Coast” – in achieving their 
objective of improving cash flow throughout the construction industry. Success parameters 
are identified by the authors – namely: the levels of justice afforded by the legislation, the 
administrative and legal burden generated by the legislation, and the impact of the legislation 
on the relationships between the contracting parties – which are used as a basis to discuss 
and compare the performances of the East and West Coast models. It is concluded that the 
West Coast model provides a more just dispute resolution process, generates less 
administrative and legal burden, and is more conducive towards establishing positive 
relationships between contracting parties. However, it is recognised that there is a need for 
more data to be gathered from construction industry stakeholders before any firm 
recommendations can start to be made as to the most appropriate conceptual framework 
and detail for a harmonised approach. 
 
 
Introduction  
Over the past decade construction industry payments legislation (the „legislation‟) has been 
progressively passed on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis throughout Australia.1 The first 
jurisdiction to pass such legislation was NSW. The NSW Act, based upon the adjudication 
provisions within the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 formed the 
model upon which most other Australian jurisdictions, to varying degrees, based their 
legislation, culminating in the Tasmanian Act which received Royal Assent on 17 December 
2009.2  
 
The current state of construction industry payment legislation throughout Australia, however, 
is somewhat fragmented, and there have been calls from several commentators for a 
harmonised national approach (Bailey 2009, Zhang 2009, Bell & Vella 2010). This paper 
initially examines the division and inconsistencies which exist in the Australian construction 
industry payment legislation. A set of success parameters, derived from dispute resolution 
                                               
1
 The relevant legislation, in order of commencement, is: Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment 
Act 1999 (NSW) – the „NSW Act‟, Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2002 (Victoria) – 
the „Victorian Act‟, Building and Construction Industry Payments Act 2004 (Qld) – the „Qld Act‟, Construction 
Contracts (Security of Payments) Act 2004 (NT) – the „NT Act‟, Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA) – the „WA 
Act‟, Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2009 (Tas) – the „Tasmanian Act‟, Building and 
Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2009 (ACT) – the „ACT Act‟, Building and Construction Industry 
Security of Payment Act 2009 (SA) – the „SA Act‟. The Acts commenced operation on the following dates: 26 
March 2000 (NSW), 31 January 2003 (Vic), 1 October 2004 (Qld), 1 January 2005 (WA), 1 July 2005 (NT), 17 
December 2009 (Tas). Note that the ACT Act comes into force on 1 July 2010, and the SA Act comes into force 
on a date which, as at early August 2010, was yet to be proclaimed. 
2
 Although the Tasmanian Act commenced operation before the ACT and SA Acts, it was actually the last Act to 
be passed by Parliament in Australia. 
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literature, is then proposed as a basis for a subsequent review, comparison and assessment 
of the key provisions, and performance, of construction industry payment legislation in 
Australia to date. These parameters include the justice afforded, and the administrative and 
legal burdens generated, by the legislation. 
 
One Destination, Eight Different Paths  
The common objective of the raft of legislation, apparent from the Second Reading 
Speeches for each of the Acts,3 is to facilitate the flow of cash in a swift manner down the 
hierarchical contractual chain on construction projects. Thus, the legislation is aimed at 
“improving payment outcomes for all parties operating in the building and construction 
industry”.4  
 
The East Coast-West Coast Divide 
The WA and NT legislative models significantly differ from the other Australian Acts in both 
their underlying conceptual frameworks and in the detail of the drafting which is laid upon 
them. This has led to the WA and NT Acts, which bear more resemblance to construction 
industry payments legislation proposed by the Cole Commission Report (2003: Volume 8, 
Appendix 1) and more in harmony with the legislation passed in the UK and NZ, being 
distinguished from the other Australian Acts. 
 
Accordingly, the WA and NT Acts have been collectively labelled as the “West Coast” model‟ 
legislation as opposed to the “East Coast” model tag given to the other Australian Acts which 
more closely resemble the NSW Act.5  
 
All the Acts comprise common constituent elements including the type of work and contracts 
covered, the mechanisms for enforcing regular payments and the process for undertaking 
and enforcing adjudication of disputes arising under the Acts (Bell & Vella 2010: 575) 
However, within these common constituent elements, key differences exist between the East 
and West Coast models. These are broadly summarised as follows: 
 
 The East Coast model Acts provide a detailed statutory payments regime, overriding 
any inconsistent contractual provisions, which parties undertaking “construction work” 
or “related goods and services” may choose to engage by submitting a payment 
claim under the Act at regular intervals and have it responded to within a certain 
timeframe. Conversely, the West Coast model Acts largely preserve (rather than 
override) the parties‟ contractual interim payment regimes.  
 
 The East Coast model Acts only allow for payment claims to be made up the 
“contractual stream” (typically by a subcontractor against its head contractor, or head 
contractor against its principal). Conversely, the West Coast model allows for 
payment claims both up and down the “contractual stream”. 
 
 Whilst both models allow for a statutory adjudication scheme to determine, in the 
interim, 6  disputed payment claims, they differ with respect to adjudicator 
appointment, submissions which may be considered by an adjudicator, and the 
approach which an adjudicator is to adopt in order to arrive at his or her 
                                               
3
  ACT (Hargreaves J, 15 October 2009); NSW (Iemma M, 29 June 1999); NT (Toyne P, 14 October 2004); 
Queensland (R E Schwarten, 18 March 2004); SA (Kenyon T, 5 March 2009); Tasmania (Singh L M, 4 November 
2009); Victoria (Thomson M R, 21 March 2002); WA (MacTiernan A J, 3 March 2004). 
4
 R E Schwarten MP, in delivering the Second Reading Speech for the Queensland Bill Similarly broad 
aspirations are expressed in the Second Reading Speeches for each of the other Acts (cited above). 
5
 Davenport (2010: 36) has recently described the categories as, respectively, “the UK model” (West Coast) and 
“the Australian model” (East Coast). 
6
 Subject to final determination in arbitration or litigation. 
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determination. In all of these respects the East Coast Acts are more restrictive 
(Coggins 2009), disallowing mutual agreement of an adjudicator, consideration of 
reasons for withholding payment which have not been duly submitted in accordance 
with the statutory payment scheme, and discouraging an evaluative approach to 
adjudicators‟ determinations.  
 
The Devil in the Detail 
Whilst the conceptual divisions between the East and West Coast Acts are readily-apparent, 
there are many detailed aspects in which the Acts – even those within the same “model” 
grouping – diverge.  These differences are often not revealed without a word-by-word 
comparison, yet they can make for significant differences in the practical effect of the 
legislation in different parts of Australia.  Indeed, once these disparities are appreciated, 
industry stakeholders – whether subcontractors challenging a payment schedule outside of 
their home State or general counsel of national contractors charged with drafting appropriate 
contractual provisions – may be forgiven for regarding the law as a multi-headed hydra 
rather than a guardian angel.    
 
Some of these differences are fairly well known, such as the way in which Victoria differs 
from the other “East Coast” jurisdictions in relation to matters which can be included in a 
payment claim under the Act (and therefore subject to the Act‟s default provisions for 
payment and adjudication) This is discussed in O'Reilly and Stankiewicz (2006), Ridley 
(2006), Warren & Thwaites (2007), Redenbach (2007: 102-4). Others are less obvious – for 
example, the implications of the “counting of days” provisions in the Acts. In the NT, 
Tasmania, Victoria and WA time continues to run for these purposes through the days 
between Christmas and the New Year which are not public holidays but comprise the 
traditional industry shutdown, whereas the ACT, NSW, Queensland and SA Acts expressly 
exclude this period.7 
 
The differences are exemplified by the provisions dealing with the types of arrangements to 
which the various Acts apply. The starting point for such analysis under the Acts is the 
definition of “construction work” (or, in Tasmania, “building and construction work”). This is 
fundamental under each of the relevant Acts because it is contracts for such work, or for 
“related goods and services”, which are “construction contracts” to which the Act applies.8   
 
The definition of “construction work” in s 5 of the NSW Act has its origins in section 105 of 
the UK Act.  It reads as follows: 
 
5 Definition of “construction work” 
(1) In this Act, construction work means any of the following work:  
(a) the construction, alteration, repair, restoration, maintenance, extension, demolition 
or dismantling of buildings or structures forming, or to form, part of land (whether 
permanent or not), 
(b) the construction, alteration, repair, restoration, maintenance, extension, demolition 
or dismantling of any works forming, or to form, part of land, including walls, 
roadworks, power-lines, telecommunication apparatus, aircraft runways, docks and 
harbours, railways, inland waterways, pipelines, reservoirs, water mains, wells, 
sewers, industrial plant and installations for purposes of land drainage or coast 
protection, 
                                               
7
 See the definition of “business day” (or, in the NT, “working day”) in each Act other than the WA Act.  The WA 
Act uses the term “day” (rather than “business day”), so for the purpose of counting days it is assumed that every 
day is counted. 
8
 See ACT Act: Dictionary and ss 7-9; NSW Act ss 4-7; NT Act ss 5-7 and 9; Queensland Act ss 3 and 10-11 and 
Sch 2; SA ss 4-7; Tasmanian Act ss 4-7; Victorian Act ss 4-7; WA Act ss 3-5 and 7.  General commentary on 
these definitions (albeit written prior to the passage of all of the Acts) is provided in, eg, Jacobs (2010: 42-4 & 48-
9; Davenport (2004: 27-29). 
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(c)  the installation in any building, structure or works of fittings forming, or to form, 
part of land, including heating, lighting, air-conditioning, ventilation, power supply, 
drainage, sanitation, water supply, fire protection, security and communications 
systems, 
(d) the external or internal cleaning of buildings, structures and works, so far as it is 
carried out in the course of their construction, alteration, repair, restoration, 
maintenance or extension, 
(e) any operation which forms an integral part of, or is preparatory to or is for 
rendering complete, work of the kind referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c), 
including:  
(i) site clearance, earth-moving, excavation, tunnelling and boring, and 
(ii) the laying of foundations, and 
(iii) the erection, maintenance or dismantling of scaffolding, and 
(iv) the prefabrication of components to form part of any building, structure or 
works, whether carried out on-site or off-site, and 
(v) site restoration, landscaping and the provision of roadways and other access 
works, 
(f) the painting or decorating of the internal or external surfaces of any building, 
structure or works, 
(g) any other work of a kind prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this 
subsection. 
(2) Despite subsection (1), construction work does not include any of the following work:  
(a) the drilling for, or extraction of, oil or natural gas, 
(b) the extraction (whether by underground or surface working) of minerals, including 
tunnelling or boring, or constructing underground works, for that purpose, 
(c) any other work of a kind prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this 
subsection. 
 
Turning to the other East Coast Acts, most follow the NSW definition closely: 
 
 the ACT provision (s 7) is substantially identical to the NSW provision but has been 
reformatted; 
 the Queensland provision (s 10) is identical to the NSW save for some minor wording 
and syntax changes and the express inclusion (via a new sub-section (1)(g)) of the 
testing of soils and road making materials; 
 the South Australian provision (s 5) likewise makes minor wording changes but its 
only substantive amendment is expressly to include fencing in sub-section (1)(e); and 
 the Victorian provision (s 5) is identical to the NSW. 
 
However, the Tasmanian provision (s 5) has been reformatted and re-worded significantly.  It 
incorporates most of the elements of the other East Coast provisions but with many 
alterations in terminology (for example, “docks and harbours” has been replaced by “marine 
infrastructure” and “power lines” has been replaced by “energy infrastructure”).  
 
Moreover, a number of matters have been expressly included within the ambit of the 
Tasmanian Act; for example, structures supporting agricultural, horticultural or forestry 
products (Section 5(1)(a)(vi)), or allowing access to certain types of activities (Section 
5(1)(a)(vii)).  Matters which have been added to those covered by the “fittings” (here, 
“systems or services”) provision (sub-section (1)(c)) include passenger and goods lifts 
(Section 5(1)(c)(iii)) and plumbing installations (Section 5(1)(c)(iii)). On the other hand, drainage, 
sanitation and water supply have disappeared from that list of examples. 
 
The gulf, noted above, between the East and West Coast Acts in underlying intent and 
drafting scheme is reflected in the definition of “construction work” in the WA and NT Acts.  
Whilst there is much that is compatible in the ultimate effect of the provisions, there are also 
 Australasian Journal of Construction Economics and Building 
Coggins, J et al. (2010) ‘Towards harmonisation of construction industry payment legislation: a consideration of the 
success afforded by the East and West Coast models in Australia’, Australasian Journal of Construction Economics and 
Building, 10 (3) 14-35  
18 
significant differences.  Moreover, a detailed comparison of the Acts is necessary in order to 
ascertain whether a particular activity falls within or outside the scope of the Act.9   
 
Turning first to the types of work which –10 subject to the exclusions noted below –11 fall 
within the definition, the West Coast Acts are, in fact, wider in ambit than those of the East 
Coast.  This is due, primarily, to the express mention of: 
 
 work relating to reclaiming, draining, or preventing the subsidence, movement or 
erosion of, land;12 and 
 off-shore construction of civil works and buildings (whereas, under the East Coast 
Acts, works need to be “forming, or to form, part of the land”).13 
 
Having said that, there are also significant differences between the West and East Coast 
Acts in respect of activities which are excluded. These are perhaps best understood by using 
s 5 of the NSW Act (set out above) as a base:14 
 
 the drilling and extraction exclusion in respect of oil and natural gas extends, under 
the NT and WA Acts, to drilling for the purposes of discovery of such materials;15 
 in respect of the minerals exclusion, the NSW Act refers to their “extraction (whether 
by underground or surface working)… including tunnelling or boring, or constructing 
underground works, for that purpose”,16 whereas the NT and WA Acts: 
o exclude “constructing a shaft, pit or quarry, or drilling, for the purposes of 
discovering or extracting any mineral bearing or other substance”;17 
o do not expressly exclude the process of extraction of minerals; and 
o also do not expressly exclude tunnelling or boring – indeed, these are expressly 
mentioned in the inclusions sub-section;18  
 the WA Act (but not the NT Act)19 excludes both sub- and above-surface plant, 
through its broadly-framed reference to “constructing any plant for the purposes of 
extracting or processing oil, natural gas or any derivative of natural gas, or any 
mineral bearing or other substance”;20 
                                               
9
 Whilst this paper does not purport to provide such an analysis, it is noted, for example, that the West Coast Acts 
use a separate definition of “civil works” (NT Act s 4; WA s  4(1)) to provide an expanded listing of the 
infrastructure works referred to in sub-s (1)(b) of the East Coast Acts. 
10
 NT Act s 6(1); WA Act s 4(2).   
11
 NT Act s 6(2); WA Act s 4(3). 
12
 NT Act s 6(1)(a); WA Act s 4(2)(a).  Having said that, the reference to “coast protection” in sub-s (1)(b) of the 
East Coast Acts may be expected to cover certain of these activities. 
13
 NT Act s 6(1)(c); WA Act s 4(2)(c).  The East Coast wording is in sub-s (1)(b). 
14
 It should be noted, generally, that each of these exclusions (other than that in respect of watercraft – see n 24 
below) is subject to the relevant work being on a site in the NT or WA (as applicable) whereas there is no such 
territorial restriction in the East Coast Acts. 
15
 NSW Act s 5(2)(a); NT Act s 6(2)(a); WA Act s 4(3)(a). 
16
 NSW Act s 5(2)(b). 
17
 NT Act s 6(2)(b); WA Act s 4(3)(b).  No express guidance is given as to the ambit of “other substance”. 
18
 NT Act s 6(1)(f)(i); WA Act s 4(2)(f)(i).  It may, however, be expected that tunnelling and boring will usually fall 
outside the ambit of “construction work” either through the “constructing…” exclusion referred to in the first sub-
point above or because mining is not an activity referred to in the inclusions sub-section; 
19
 The difference is acknowledged in the Second Reading Speech for the NT Act (Toyne, n 5 above) but no 
commentary is provided upon it.  However, by adopting the WA Act drafting scheme but leaving out its paragraph 
(c), the NT Act does not incorporate the exclusion of underground works which is found in paragraph (b) of the 
East Coast Act exclusions.  Moreover, though s 6(2)(d) allows for other work to be excluded by Regulation, there 
is no such provision in the Construction Contracts (Security of Payments) Regulations 2005, the only Regulations 
which (as of April 2010) have been made under the NT Act.  Thus, whether such is the intent or not, the Northern 
Territory is the only place in Australia where the construction of underground works is covered by the security of 
payment Act. 
20
 WA Act s 4(3)(c). 
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 the NT and WA Acts have carried through the UK Act exclusion in relation to wholly 
artistic works, albeit in modified terms;21 and 
 the NT and WA Acts specifically exclude “constructing the whole or any part of 
watercraft”.22 
 
Does Inconsistency Hamper Economic Efficiency? 
The “construction work” analysis in the previous section is but one example of how the 
various Australian Acts‟ approaches are far from consistent.  It also demonstrates that 
ascertaining such a basic matter as whether a particular activity is covered by the scheme 
demands a painstaking and time-consuming legal analysis.  Such inconsistency and lack of 
accessibility seems, at the very least, to run counter to the desire to achieve for the industry 
“a fast, cheap, non-legalistic way of resolving payment for work done or material or services 
supplied”.23 
 
The inefficiencies inherent in such a situation are readily apparent.  It has been observed, for 
example, that detailed regimes for inclusions and exclusions from the legislative scheme 
tend to lead to uncertainty and court intervention (Constable 2006).24  In the early years of 
the UK Act‟s operation, for instance, there were many attempts to run the “fallacious” 
argument that, wherever a power generation plant was included within a construction 
project, the entirety of the project was excluded from the ambit of the Act by dint of the 
“power generation” carve-out in s 105(2)(c)(i) (Coulson 2007:35).25 
 
More fundamentally, any such scheme of inclusions and exclusions – and, especially, one 
which applies in markedly inconsistent ways across the nation – exposes the issue of 
whether the legislation does, in fact, represent a worthy reform for the industry.  For His 
Honour Judge Humphrey Lloyd (as he then was), commenting upon the UK Act in 2001, the 
related underlying questions included:   
 
if adjudication is such a good idea, why does it not apply to all sectors of the 
construction industry?...  If it is a good idea but it is not needed in the well-managed 
and harmonious parts of the industry then why go to the trouble of such convoluted 
exceptions – if there will be no need to have recourse to adjudication then there need 
be no exemptions.  Will those working there have anything to worry about?  If they are 
concerned then what troubles them?  Is reform in fact needed? (Lloyd 2001: 450)
26 
 
These are issues which go to the heart of the legislation both as enacted and as it may be 
reformed. Debate upon these questions is, however, hampered by there being little explicit 
guidance provided by the legislatures as to why the inclusions and exclusions are defined as 
they are.  In the British context, Judge Coulson has noted that there was significant criticism 
within the UK Parliament of the UK Act‟s scheme of exclusions – one MP proposed, for 
example, that “[t]here is no more reason to exclude the process industries than to exempt 
drivers who have never had an accident from obeying the Highway Code”.27   
 
                                               
21
 NT Act s 6(2)(c); WA Act s 4(3)(d). 
22
 NT Act s 6(3); WA Act s 4(4). 
23
 Victorian Building Commission introduction to the Victorian Act, at www.buildingcommission.com.au.  
24
 Commenting upon the debates within the British Parliament in relation to the listing of included and excluded 
contracts, His Honour Judge Peter Coulson QC (Coulson 2007: 27) noted that “[i]t is difficult not to feel instinctive 
sympathy with those who pointed out… that these definitions were likely to lead to just the sort of disputes that 
the Act itself was designed to avoid.”  
25
 His Honour summarises these cases at pp 35-6 and their resolution of the issue by reference to identification 
of the “primary activity” within the site. 
26
 See, similarly, Coulson 2007: 9-10. 
27
 Peter Thurnham, MP (House of Commons, 8 July 1996), cited at Coulson 2007: 10-11. 
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Despite such misgivings, the lengthy list of included and excluded “construction operations” 
was carried through into the UK Act (and, as noted above, has formed the basis for the 
various Australian Acts‟ approaches). Likewise, the Second Reading speeches for the WA 
and NT Acts provide no guidance as to why, for example, the exclusions from the ambit of 
“construction work” are substantially different from those of the NSW Act which preceded 
them.  
 
Doubtless there are reasons which the relevant Parliaments found compelling as to the 
extent to which legislative intervention is needed, especially within the WA process plant, 
mining and oil and gas industries.  However, without explicit guidance as to the policy intent, 
the reform process as carried into law in each State and Territory is left open to the criticism 
that it simply reflects the inevitable tendency, identified by Davenport (2006: 21), for a 
“competition between various vested interests”.28 
 
Towards Harmonisation  
Few in the industry would seriously advocate that the present, disjointed situation ought to 
continue; rather, there have been increasing calls  – echoing those of the Cole Royal 
Commission (Cole 2003) nearly a decade ago – to forge a uniform national approach to 
security of payment regulation (Bailey 2009, Zhang 2009, Bell & Vella 2010).  Marcus 
Jacobs QC (Jacobs 2007: 16), for example, has observed that: 
 
[i]t must be a matter of considerable confusion to practitioners advising clients who 
have projects in more than one State/ Territory where there is so little uniformity in the 
comparative legislation…. The sooner there is uniform legislation in a relatively small 
country such as Australia, the better for the construction industry. 
 
The key question at this stage is how such an approach might be achieved, especially given 
the lack of consensus as reflected in both the statutes and their interpretation by the Courts.   
 
It is suggested that one approach or step towards achieving harmonisation and consensus is 
to review and assess the performance of the existing legislative schemes to date, such that 
the most successful legislative aspects may be identified for adoption into a unified model. 
However, such an approach is not straightforward as the identification of parameters of 
success vis à vis the operation of the legislation is likely to be contentious and, of itself, 
would require general consensus for such an approach to be effective.  
 
Nevertheless, in order to initiate debate as to the performance of existing legislative 
schemes in the interests of identifying the most desirable characteristics for a harmonised 
model, the remainder of this article aims to review, compare and assess the provisions and 
performance of the two Australian legislative models – East Coast and West Coast – against 
key parameters of success identified by the authors. Such an approach will assist in 
revealing observed strengths and weaknesses in the enacted legislative models, with a view 
to informing an approach to national harmonisation. Further, observations with respect to 
provisions of construction industry payments legislation enacted outside of Australia29 will be 
                                               
28
 Reflecting this, of the eight Second Reading Speeches referred to in n 5 above, six noted expressly that 
industry groups (whether state- or nationally-based) offered views which led to the relevant Act being put forward, 
but only one – that of Tasmania – referred to the desire to align conditions with those in other jurisdictions.  
Having said that, “benefit[ting] building and construction firms with national or interstate operations by improving 
consistency between payment regimes across all three jurisdictions” was mentioned in the Second Reading 
Speech for the 2006 Bill amending the Victorian Act (M R Thomson MP, 15 June 2006). 
29
  The UK Act, Construction Contracts Act 2002 (NZ) – the „NZ Act‟, and Building and Construction Industry 
Security of Payment Act 2004 (Singapore) – the „Singapore Act‟.  Moreover, there are moves afoot in Ireland and 
Malaysia to introduce legislation similar to the UK Act:  respectively, the Construction Contracts Bill 2010 was 
presented to the Seanad É ireann on 12 May 2010 and a preliminary draft of the Malaysian Construction Industry 
Payment and Adjudication Act was published in 2009 and is available at  www.cidb.gov.my. 
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made where such reference may contribute towards optimal harmonisation of the legislation 
in Australia.   
 
Key Success Parameters  
To date, performance of existing construction industry payments legislation in Australia has 
been monitored in the form of quantitative statistical data collated by the relevant 
administering government departments, or agencies, in each jurisdiction.30 This statistical 
data collates such information as number of adjudication applications made and total values 
of adjudicated payment claims and determinations each year. The data shows that, to 
varying degrees in each jurisdiction, the legislation is achieving its objective of improving 
cash flow within the construction industry as the number and total value of payment claims 
determined in adjudication has increased annually. This increase has been particularly 
marked in NSW and Queensland where, by 2008/09, the number of annual adjudication 
applications in each jurisdiction had reached approximately 1000, and total value of payment 
claims in adjudication approximately $200 million. 31  In WA there were 105 adjudication 
applications 32  made in 2008/09 and a total value of payment claims in adjudication of 
approximately $36 million (Construction Contracts Registrar 2009). 
 
The significant take-up rates of statutory adjudication in NSW and Queensland have led to 
observations that the payments legislation in these jurisdictions has been effective in 
resolving disputes of all sizes.33 Accordingly, Riddell (2009: 1) observed that: 
 
The security of payment legislation, particularly in New South Wales and in 
Queensland, appear to have been remarkably successful in achieving its object of 
ensuring that a person who undertakes construction work or provides related goods 
and services is entitled to receive and is able to recover progress payments. 
 
Whilst such data indicates a significant uptake of statutory adjudication and resultant flow of 
cash in the construction industry over the relatively short time the legislation has been 
enacted, it is contended that to draw any conclusions as to overall longer term legislative 
success based solely upon such data would be imprudent and misleading. It is proposed 
that such longer term success is predicated upon continued satisfaction of all stakeholders in 
the construction industry with the legislation‟s payment and adjudication schemes. 
Therefore, it is argued that there are several other parameters which must be considered in 
assessing the success of the legislation in meeting its objective of achieving sustained 
improvement of cash flow throughout the construction industry. These parameters include 
the levels of justice afforded by the statutory scheme, the consequential costs of the 
legislative scheme to the construction industry both in terms of administrative and legal 
burden generated, and the impact of the legislation (positive or negative) on the relationships 
between the contracting parties.34 
 
                                               
30
 NSW Procurement Division, Department of Services, Technology and Administration; Building Commission 
Victoria; Building and Construction Industry Payments Agency (Qld); Building Management & Works Division, 
Department of Treasury and Finance (WA); and, Department of Justice (NT). 
31
 More accurately, as reported by Building & Construction Industry Payments Agency (2009)  and NSW 
Procurement (2009): 940 adjudication applications in NSW during the 2008 calendar year and 999 adjudication 
applications in Queensland during the 2008/09 financial year; and, $187,034,897 claimed in adjudication in NSW 
during the 2008 calendar year and $234,564,850 claimed in adjudication in Queensland during the 2008/09 
financial year.  
32
 However, it must be remembered that the population of WA is only 2.56 million compared with 4.45 million in 
Queensland and 7.17 million in NSW (Population data sourced from Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 
Australian Demographic Statistics, September Quarter 2009 available on ABS website <http//:www.abs.gov.au>). 
33
 See Building & Construction Industry Payments Agency 2009: 6; and, NSW Procurement 2009: 4. 
34
 It is notable that the UK legislation followed the report of Sir Michael Latham (Latham 1993). That report 
emphasised the importance of dispute resolution systems on the crucial ingredient of trust within the construction 
process.  
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These parameters encapsulate three of the criteria identified by Ury, Brett & Goldberg (1988: 
11) in their seminal textbook on dispute resolution, used for comparing the different 
approaches to resolution of disputes: transaction costs, 35  satisfaction with outcomes (of 
which justice in outcome and process is a key component), and recurrence of disputes. Ury, 
Brett & Goldberg (1988: 12) noted that these criteria are interrelated in that dissatisfaction 
with outcomes contributes to recurrence of disputes,36 which in turn increases transaction 
costs.  
 
Accordingly, therefore, it is suggested that an unsustainable dispute resolution process is 
characterised by stakeholder dissatisfaction with outcomes, a relatively high proportion of 
recurring disputes and relatively high transaction costs. Conversely, a sustainable dispute 
resolution process is characterised by stakeholder satisfaction with outcomes, a relatively 
low proportion of recurring disputes and low transaction costs. In particular, a dispute 
resolution process that enables a high degree of trust between contracting parties will 
encourage an effective and efficient industry, and vice-versa. 
 
Justice in Dispute Resolution 
A linchpin of all the legislation is the interim resolution of payment claim disputes via a 
mandatory adjudication scheme. This scheme represents a dispute resolution method or 
process which, in the context of construction payment claims disputes, may be considered 
as an integral component of an overall dispute resolution system – this system being a multi-
stepped series of dispute resolution methods which may typically involve negotiation, 
adjudication, arbitration and/or litigation. Much has been written in the field of dispute system 
design with respect to the significance of justice in the evaluation of dispute resolution 
systems. An initial overview of key points arising from this literature provides a useful basis 
to inform a subsequent analysis of justice afforded by each the statutory adjudication 
schemes under the East and West Coast models. 
 
Many varieties of justice have been identified in connection with dispute resolution (see, for 
example: Bingham 2008). Of these, substantive and, in particular, procedural justice are 
most often cited as impacting upon satisfaction with dispute resolution systems. According to 
Ury, Brett & Goldberg (1988: 12): 
  
Satisfaction [with a dispute resolution process] may also depend on whether the disputant 
believes that the resolution is fair. Even if an agreement does not wholly fulfil her interests, a 
disputant may draw some satisfaction from the resolution‟s fairness. 
 
Substantive, or distributive, justice essentially refers to the fairness of the outcome produced 
by a decision process. Procedural justice refers to the justice of the processes or methods 
used to arrive at distributive justice.  
 
Procedural justice recognises that a disputant‟s satisfaction with a method or system of 
dispute resolution is a function of process rather than outcome. Several authors have 
identified procedural justice as integral to satisfaction with a dispute resolution process (Ury, 
Brett & Goldberg 1988: 12; Constantino & Sickles Merchant 1996: 173; Susskind & 
Cruikshank 1987: 24). Further, the perception of a fair process has been acknowledged to 
be as important as the reality of impartiality (Bingham 1997: 215). There is some consensus 
that if disputants believe that the dispute resolution process has been fair they may be more 
willing to accept decisions (Tyler 2000 as seen in Van Veen, Kreutzwiser & de Loë 2003), 
                                               
35
 Defined by Ury, Brett & Goldberg (1988: 11) as “the time, money, and emotional energy expended in disputing, 
the resources consumed and destroyed, and the opportunities lost. 
36
 In the case of statutory adjudication, recurrence of disputes may take the form of an application to the courts to 
have the adjudicator‟s determination rendered void, or the referral of an adjudicated payment dispute to a final 
dispute resolution process such as arbitration or litigation. 
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and that a sense or perception of procedural justice may be as, or more, important than the 
outcome (Ury, Brett & Goldberg 1988: 12; Lind, EA, & Tyler, TR 1988: 85 & 95). De Cremer 
and van Knippenberg (2003: 8) suggest that procedural justice becomes especially 
important to disputants when outcomes are unfavourable to them.  
 
With respect to evaluating procedural fairness of dispute resolution processes, the following 
questions have been raised as pertinent: 
 
 Were all the groups who wanted to participate given an adequate chance to do so? 
(Susskind & Cruikshank 1987: 24) 
 Was everyone given an opportunity to express his or her views? (Susskind & 
Cruikshank 1987: 24; and Ury, Brett & Goldberg 1988: 12 & 33) 
 How much were the disputants able to participate in shaping the settlement? (Ury, 
Brett & Goldberg 1988: 12 & 34) 
 Did the disputants believe that the third party, if there was one, acted fairly? (Ury, 
Brett & Goldberg 1988: 12 & 37) 
 
A Consideration of Justice in the East and West Coast Legislation 
Key differences exist between the East and West Coast models with respect to the payment 
and adjudication schemes provided. These differences impact upon the measures of 
procedural and substantive justice afforded by each model. 
 
Payment Systems 
The East Coast model operates a “dual payment” system for progress payment claims, 
creating a statutory payment system which runs alongside any contractual regime.37 In order 
to engage the statutory payment system, a claimant must endorse its payment claim as 
being made under the Act 38 and serve it upon the respondent.39 The West Coast model does 
not operate a dual payment system, but rather payment claims referred to in the Act are 
those made under the contractual regime. Thus, a claimant under the East Coast model may 
only avail itself of the Act‟s dispute resolution processes if it endorses its progress payment 
as being made under the Act. This endorsement requirement is a potential barrier to 
procedural justice in the East Coast model, as a contractor or supplier may deliberately 
refrain from endorsing its payment claim through fear of negative repercussions 40  in its 
relationship with the principal. This effectively denies such a contractor or supplier access to 
the dispute resolution process available under the Act.  
 
Indeed, a 2007 survey carried out by Brand & Uher (2010: 17), which sought to assess the 
performance of the NSW Act by surveying the members of two peak trade associations 
operating in NSW, found that around half of the sampled contractor and subcontractor firms 
felt that endorsement of payment claims negatively affects to some degree the working 
relationship between the parties to a payment claim.41 Conversely, under the West Coast 
model, there is no such scope for a party to be deterred from accessing the Act‟s dispute 
resolution process as statutory adjudication is available merely on the basis of a dispute 
having arisen on a contractual payment claim.42  
                                               
37
 Beckhaus v Brewarrina Council [2002] NSWSC 960 per Macready AJ at [60]. Such a dual payment system 
was described as a “dual railroad track system” by Macready AJ in Transgrid v Siemens & Anor [2004] NSWSC 
87 at [56]. 
38
 See s 13(2)(c) of the NSW Act. 
39
 See s 13(1) of the NSW Act. 
40
 Such as, in its most extreme form, being “blacklisted” by the principal with respect to being offered work on 
future contracts.   
41
 Nevertheless, the same survey showed that about two-thirds of respondent firms either “always” or “usually” 
endorse payment claims as being made under the Act – Brand & Uher 2010: 16. 
42
 Under the West Coast model, either party may apply for adjudication of a payment dispute within 28 days after 
the dispute arises (see s 26(1) of the WA Act). A payment dispute arises if by the time when the amount claimed 
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Scope of Payment Claims 
The East Coast model provides for recovery of progress payments only and, therefore, its 
dispute resolution processes may only be used by a contractor or supplier to recover 
payment from a principal, i.e., “upstream” claims. Herein lies another potential barrier to 
procedural justice in the East Coast model, as the judiciary has allowed claimants to recover 
amounts for delay damages in adjudicated payment claims under the Act. 43  This, as 
Davenport (2007: 14) puts it, creates an “imbalance” as only one party is allowed to apply for 
adjudication of payment disputes regarding damages. As claims for damages falling within 
the scope of the contract have the potential to be made by either contractual party,44 it would 
appear to be blatantly unfair to allow only one party the right to refer such claims to the Act‟s 
dispute resolution processes.  
 
No such injustice exists in the West Coast model. The scope of the West Coast model is 
wider, providing the right for either party to make an adjudication application in relation to 
any payment disputes falling within the scope of the building contract, including debts and 
damages claims (see s 25 of the WA Act).  
 
Right to Defend a Payment Claim 
Under the East Coast model‟s statutory payment regime, a respondent has up to 10 
business days45 after the payment claim is served to serve a payment schedule indicating 
the amount of the payment it proposes to make. If the scheduled amount is less than the 
claimed amount, the schedule must indicate why the scheduled amount is less with reasons 
for withholding payment (see s 14(3) of the NSW Act).  If the respondent either schedules an 
amount less than the payment claim or fails to pay the whole or part of the scheduled 
amount by the due date, the claimant may make an adjudication application under the Act (s 
17(1)) 
  
In the case where a claimant disputes a lesser amount that has been scheduled and paid, 
the claimant must serve an adjudication application on an Authorised Nominating Authority 
(ANA) of its choice (s 17(3)(b) of the NSW Act) with a copy served on the respondent (s 
17(5)) within 10 business days s 17(3)(c) after receiving the payment schedule. 46  The 
respondent then has either a period of 5 business days47 after receiving a copy of the 
application or 2 business days48 after receiving notice of an adjudicator‟s acceptance of the 
application, whichever is the later, to lodge an adjudication response with the adjudicator.49   
 
If the respondent does not duly provide a payment schedule, it becomes liable to pay the 
claimed amount to the claimant on the due date for the progress payment (s 14(4)(b) of the 
NSW Act). Where no payment schedule is provided, the claimant has two paths available 
under the Act by which to recover the payment claim.  
 
The first path is for the claimant to seek summary judgment in court for the debt due (s 
15(2)(a)(i) of the NSW Act), in which case the respondent is not entitled to bring any cross-
                                                                                                                                                  
in a payment claim is due to be paid under the contract, the amount has not been paid in full, or the claim has 
been rejected or wholly or partly disputed (see s 6(a) of the WA Act).  
43
 See Coordinated Construction Co Pty Ltd v JM Hargreaves Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 228; Coordinated 
Construction Co Pty Ltd v Climatech (Canberra) Pty Ltd & Ors . [2005] NSWCA 229; Minister for Commerce 
(formerly Public Works & Services) v Contrax Plumbing (NSW) Pty Ltd & Ors [2005] NSWCA 142; and, John 
Holland Pty Limited v Roads & Traffic Authority of New South Wales & Ors [2007] NSWCA 19. 
44
 Eg, contractors‟ claims for delay and disruption costs caused by principals, and principals‟ claims for liquidated 
or general damages for contractor‟s delay in achieving practical completion.    
45
 Except in the SA Act which allows 15 business days – see s 14(4)(b)(ii) of the SA Act. 
46
Except in the SA Act which allows 15 business days – see s 17(3)(c) of the SA Act. 
47
 Except in the Tasmanian Act (7 business days) and ACT Act  (10 business days). 
48
 Except in the Tasmanian Act (5 business days) and ACT Act  (5 business days). 
49
 See s 20(1) of the NSW Act. 
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claim against the defendant in the summary judgment proceedings, or raise any defence in 
relation to matters arising under the construction contract (s 15(4)(b) of the NSW Act). The 
second path is for the claimant to apply for the payment claim to be determined in 
adjudication,50 in which case the respondent will be disallowed from lodging an adjudication 
response (s 20(2A) of the NSW Act), effectively denying the respondent any voice during the 
adjudication51 as an adjudicator is essentially limited to a consideration of the submissions 
duly made by the parties52 when determining an adjudication(s 22(2) of the NSW Act).  
 
Even in circumstances where the respondent has duly served a payment schedule, it may 
only include in its adjudication response reasons for withholding payment which have 
previously been included53 in the payment schedule (s 20(2B) of the NSW Act). Thus, a 
respondent may be prevented from being able to present its full case to the adjudicator 
unless it has previously served a comprehensive payment schedule which covers all the 
issues it may wish to rely on subsequently. Indeed, 41% of adjudication applications in 
Queensland to date for the 2009/10 financial year have been made on the basis that the 
respondent has failed to duly serve a payment schedule54 on the claimant (Building and 
Construction Payments Agency 2010).  
 
These highly restrictive provisions with regards to payment schedules and adjudication 
responses have a major impact upon considerations of procedural and substantive justice. 
Failure to duly serve a payment schedule not only strips the respondent of any right to 
subsequently defend the payment claim, but may also potentially result in a gross 
miscarriage of substantive justice or, at the very least, an outcome which is not perceived as 
fair by the respondent.55  
 
It is difficult to conceive of any fair and respected dispute resolution process denying the 
right for one of the parties to put forward their arguments or, at the very least, to be heard. 
Indeed, it is a fundamental right of most dispute resolution processes that both parties have 
the right to present their case.56 Lack of opportunity for the respondent to present its case, 
together with the consequent likelihood of a determination perceived as unjust by the 
respondent, would seem to be a recipe for respondent dissatisfaction with the dispute 
                                               
50
 If the claimant chooses this path, it must notify the respondent of its intention to apply for adjudication of the 
payment claim, and allow the respondent a second opportunity to serve a payment schedule within 5 business 
days from the date of such notification – see s 17(2) of the NSW Act. 
51
 This second path may be preferable to some claimants in terms of speed of recovery as the claimant may 
request an adjudication certificate from the relevant ANA stating the adjudicated amount (see s 24 of the NSW 
Act) and file the adjudication certificate as a judgment for a debt in any court of competent jurisdiction (see s 25 
of the NSW Act).   
52
 Ie, payment claim, payment schedule and all submissions that have been duly made in their support. 
53
 Furthermore, whilst a respondent cannot include in its adjudication response a reason for withholding payment 
not included in its payment schedule, it has been held in Minister for Commerce (formerly Public Works & 
Services) v Contrax Plumbing (NSW) Pty Limited [2005] NSWCA 142 per Hodgson JA at [37] that a claimant can 
raise reasons its adjudication application to substantiate entitlement to payment even though such reasons were 
not included in its payment claim, provided that such reasons are by way of response to arguments raised by the 
respondent in its payment schedule. 
54
 Such failure may be due to the potentially massive administrative task which a contractor may face of 
preparing dozens of payment schedules each month, or due to inadequate knowledge of the Act by the 
respondent. Accordingly, a survey  of contractors and subcontractors in the NSW construction industry carried 
out by Brand & Uher (2010) showed that 49% had either low or no personal knowledge of the NSW Act and 38% 
had only moderate knowledge of the NSW Act. 
55
 For example, in Walter Construction v CPL [2003] NSWSC 266, the builder submitted a payment claim for 
$14.9 million under the NSW Act. The owner principal failed to provide a payment schedule and, therefore, 
became liable for the full amount of the payment claim even though the contract superintendent subsequently 
certified a payment of $952,351. The claimant builder successfully obtained summary judgment for the full 
amount of the payment claim despite several reasons put forward by the owner to avoid summary judgment. 
56
 For example, Article 18 of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration embodies the basic principle that the parties shall be treated with equality 
and each party shall be given a full opportunity of presenting its case. 
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resolution processes provided by the East Coast model. The scores of applications by 
adjudication respondents to the NSW courts over the past decade to have adjudicators‟ 
determinations rendered void for a multitude of reasons57 are, perhaps, indicative of such 
levels of dissatisfaction and perceptions of procedural and substantive injustice.  
 
If Australia were a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, it would warrant 
serious consideration as to whether the East Coast Model may be struck down as 
offensive.58 A number of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights on compulsory 
ADR processes take the same general line: that signatory states should be given some 
latitude to make their own laws, but subject to some minimum safeguards, and in particular 
on the basis of an adequate opportunity for both parties to be heard. It is on this point that 
statistics show that the East Coast Model very frequently fails. The point is hypothetical,59 
but if several Australian states were found to have failed to meet these international 
jurisprudential standards it would be bound to have some negative impact on Australia's 
standing generally in the area of international law. 
 
Unlike the East Coast model, the West Coast model provides no detailed statutory payment 
system but rather gives primacy to the parties‟ agreed contractual payment regime.60 The 
West Coast legislation does not make the serving of a response to the payment claim61 a 
condition precedent to the right of a party who is served with an adjudication application62 to 
lodge an adjudication response. Additionally, there are no limitations as to the inclusion of 
reasons for withholding payment in a response to an adjudication application. Thus, 
providing that a party lodges their response to an adjudication application within the time 
allowed by the legislation,63 it will not be deprived of the opportunity to present its full case. 
This would appear to be a far more satisfactory approach in terms of achieving procedural 
and substantive justice in the dispute resolution process. 
Furthermore, an adjudicator under the West Coast legislation is not restricted to a 
consideration of documents submitted by the parties when making his or her determination 
as in the East Coast model.64 Rather, the legislation encourages a West Coast adjudicator to 
be more evaluative in their approach to determination by providing that an adjudicator “is not 
                                               
57
 The NSW Supreme Court has handed down at least 210 judgments, and the NSW Court of Appeal 41 
judgments, in relation to issues concerning the NSW Act since 2001. These judgments are listed on the Contract 
Administration Group‟s  
website  <http://www.contraxgroup.com/showjudgments.asp?area=1&section=1&subsection=57&state=2>  
58
 One of the authors raised the point at a lunch table in London consisting of senior construction lawyers; the 
view was unanimous that the East Coast model would be declared unlawful. In Austin Hall v Buckland Securities 
Ltd [2001] EWHC Technology 434, the court refused to declare the UK adjudication regime unlawful, but then 
logic of the decision suggests that there is a serious question as to whether the East Coast Model would have 
been treated as unlawful. Certainly, the East Model would have real difficulty in meeting the Dombo Beheer B.V. 
v The Netherlands (1993) EHRR 213 test; the court said, at page 230:  
The Court agrees with the Commission that as regards litigation involving opposing parties private 
interests, „equality of arms‟ implies that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present 
his case including his evidence under conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-
à-vis his opponent. 
For the reasons set out in this paper, the East Coast Model would likely fail this test, but the West Coast Model 
would likely pass. 
59
 Although s 24 of the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 contains the right to a 
fair hearing, which is in similar terms to Article 6 of the European Convention, upon which such a challenge could 
be attempted. 
60
 If no such payment regime is provided for in the construction contract, then the payment provisions set out in 
Schedule 1 of the legislation are implied into the contract. 
61
 Ie, the equivalent of a “payment schedule” in East Coast terminology. Although under the West Coast 
legislation a response to a payment claim is a contractual requirement rather than a statutory requirement.  
62
 Ie, the equivalent of the “respondent” in East Coast terminology. 
63
 Within 14 days (WA Act, s 27(1)) or 10 working days (NT Act, s 29(1)) after the date on which a party to a 
construction contract is served with an application for adjudication. 
64
 Which, in practice, means that an adjudicator under the East Coast legislation often makes a determination on 
documents only. 
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bound by the rules of evidence and may inform himself or herself in any way he or she thinks 
fit.”65 This has the effect of extending the adjudicator‟s investigative powers beyond the   
consideration of the parties‟ submissions, thus assisting the adjudicator in ascertaining the 
facts and the law.  
 
It is submitted that this approach would seem far more likely to result in an outcome which is 
far more palatable to both parties to the dispute if not only for the perception of justice having 
been carried out. This submission is, perhaps, borne out in the small number of applications 
to the WA Supreme Court and State Administrative Tribunal to have an adjudicator‟s 
determination set aside (see section 6.3 below)  
 
Other Issues Affecting Justice 
The East Coast model does not permit the parties any legal representation (s 21(4A) of the 
NSW Act) at conferences called by the adjudicator. The West Coast model allows the 
adjudicator to determine his or her own adjudication procedure (s 32(6) of the WA Act), and 
does not specifically preclude legal representation at hearings. Thus, in WA and the NT legal 
representation at conferences is at the adjudicator‟s discretion.  
 
Whilst the preclusion of legal representation contributes to keeping the costs of the 
adjudication process to a minimum, such preclusion may be detrimental to real and 
perceived substantive justice if it prevents the adjudicator from gaining a better 
understanding of the issues in dispute. This may particularly be so in disputes where the 
issues are of a complex nature, such as disputes regarding damages claims. In such 
disputes the barring of legal representation may, indeed, be a false economy if one of the 
parties subsequently pursues the dispute in litigation or arbitration due to a feeling of 
dissatisfaction with the way their case has been presented and/or understood in the 
adjudication process. 
 
Under the East Coast model, the adjudication application must be made to an ANA chosen 
by the claimant (s 17(3) of the NSW Act). It is then the duty of the chosen ANA to refer the 
application to an adjudicator (s 17(6) of the NSW Act). The parties, therefore, cannot agree 
upon the appointment of a particular individual as adjudicator.  
 
Under the West Coast model, the parties to the contract may agree upon a registered 
adjudicator or prescribed appointor (s 26(1)(c) of the WA Act). The provision to agree upon a 
particular individual as adjudicator may be significant to the disputing parties‟ feeling of 
perceived and real substantive justice. This is particularly so where the issues in dispute are 
of a complex nature and the parties would prefer the appointment of an adjudicator who they 
feel is suitably qualified and experienced, and in whom they have mutual confidence, to 
determine the dispute in hand within a restricted timeframe. It may, however, be argued that 
blind adjudicator appointment, as per the East Coast model, denies the opportunity for a 
party with dominant bargaining power to unfairly influence the identity of the adjudicator at 
the time of contract formation and thereby erode substantive justice. Notably, the NZ Act 
circumvents this issue by providing that any agreement about the choice of adjudicator or 
ANA/prescribed appointor is not binding if it was made before the dispute arose (s 33(3) of 
the NZ Act). 
 
The East Coast model allows the Minister to authorise ANAs to nominate adjudicators for the 
purposes of the Act (s 28(1)(a) of the NSW Act). The adjudication application must be made 
to an ANA chosen by the claimant (s 17(3) of the NSW Act). Currently, nine ANAs are 
authorised in NSW, six of which are construction or legal professional bodies or 
                                               
65
 See s 32(1)(b) of the WA Act, and s34(1)(b) of the NT Act. Note that the NT Act substitutes the word 
“appropriate” for “fit” in this provision. 
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associations, and three of which are private for-profit companies. The West Coast model 
prescribes appointers of registered adjudicators in the regulations to the Act. Currently, the 
WA regulations list eight prescribed appointers, all of which are construction or legal 
professional bodies or associations. Generally, the professional bodies and associations 
provide nomination/appointment services as part of their service to the profession they 
represent. All appointing bodies under the East and West Coast models take a commission 
from the fee paid by the disputing parties to the adjudicator, either in the form of a lump sum 
or on a percentage basis.. The level of this commission widely varies between the different 
appointing bodies from 10% for some professional bodies to around 40% for some “for profit” 
companies (South Australian House of Assembly 2009: 4617) depending upon the level of 
services each provides to their adjudicators (overhead costs) and the profit margin (if any) 
each seeks to gain from appointing adjudicators. This raises a question as to whether 
adjudication outcomes are in any way affected by a claimant‟s choice of a particular 
appointing body, and particularly whether there is any correlation between the level of 
commissions appropriated from adjudicators‟ fees by appointing bodies and substantive 
outcomes of adjudications. There appears to be little, if any, research into this question to 
date. 
 
Under the East Coast model, a claimant may take months to prepare a comprehensive and 
lengthy payment claim for delay damages for inclusion in a payment claim leaving the 
unsuspecting respondent only ten business days66 to respond in its payment schedule (s 
14(4)(b)(ii) of the Act). By way of example, Davenport (2006: 147) refers to Contrax 
Plumbing, where the claimant contractor made a progress claim including an ambit claim for 
approximately $2 million which took 12 months to prepare and was supported by two boxes 
of files detailing the claimant‟s allegations. A similar “ambush” claim may also occur under 
the West Coast model, which provides only a matter of weeks for a party to respond.67 This 
is clearly an unfair practice which inevitably results in both procedural and substantive 
injustice. A potential solution to the problem of ambush claims may be to amend the 
legislation so as to limit the length of written submissions in a similar manner to the UK 
legislation.68  
 
Administrative and Legal Burdens created by the Legislation 
Whilst the adjudication process in all Australian jurisdictions is proving to be a relatively low 
cost method of resolving payment disputes per se, 69  the real costs to the construction 
industry of mandatory adjudication need to take account of any additional consequential 
administrative and legal costs. The statutory payment system operated by the East Coast 
model inevitably creates extra administrative workload, above and beyond normal contract 
administration duties, for parties on a construction contract. This is not the case under the 
West Coast model, which allows primacy of the contractually agreed payment system.  
 
Preparation of Payment Claims 
Under the East Coast legislation, a payment claim must, amongst other things, identify the 
construction work or related services to which the progress payment relates (s 13(2) of the 
NSW Act). Accordingly, the relevant construction work has to be identified “sufficiently to 
                                               
66
 Or, as noted above, 15 business days in the case of the SA Act. 
67
 If nothing is stated in the construction contract, a party is given 14 days to respond to a payment claim under 
Schedule 1, Division 5 of the WA Act. A claimant must then apply for adjudication within 28 days after the dispute 
has arisen (see s 26(1) of the WA Act). A party who is served with an adjudication application then has 14 days 
to prepare and serve a written response to the adjudication application (see s 27(1) of the WA Act).  
68
 See Part I, s 13(g) of the UK Scheme for Construction Contracts. 
69
 Mean adjudication fees in WA reported by the Construction Contracts Registrar (2009) for the year ended 30 
June 2009 range between $1364 (for claims below $10,000) to $6065 (for claims above $500k). Mean 
adjudication fees in Queensland reported by the Building and Construction Industry Payments Agency (2009) 
range between $919 (for claims below $10,000) to $16,324 (for claims above $500k). 
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enable the respondent to understand the basis of the claim”. 70   This is “a relatively 
undemanding test”.71 However, in Protectavale Pty Ltd v K2K Pty Ltd72 the court held that a 
payment claim needs to identify which work has already been paid for (the „Protectavale 
principle‟). 73  This may present a real problem for a claimant where, as is common on 
construction contracts, the contractual basis for a claim is the total value of construction 
works completed minus payments to date, and the claimant is not able to identify what has 
been paid for and what has not. This is particularly so if the previous payments by the 
respondent are vague as to what is being paid for, and the numbers cannot be readily 
reconciled with previous claims.   
 
The Protectavale principle, therefore, has the potential to create an administratively complex 
task for claimants who need to ensure they keep track of which specific items of construction 
works have previously been paid for. This is a task which may be made especially difficult in 
the face of a canny respondent who is carefully trying to make it impossible for a claimant to 
know precisely how much it is paying for which item.74  Additionally, the application of the 
Protectavale principle means that, in a situation where a respondent has been able to 
successfully “muddy the waters” with respect to which items have been paid for, procedural 
and substantive justice may be denied to a claimant. 
 
Preparation of Payment Schedules 
It is suggested that the requirement for the respondent to prepare comprehensive payment 
schedules, in order to preserve its right to put forward the merits of its argument, is 
practicably too onerous. As one of us has noted (Fenwick Elliott 2007: 3), this feature of the 
NSW Act: 
 
sets up tens of thousands of procedural traps (one for every payment claim that is 
received) and if head contractors or principals fail to divert sufficient resources to the 
massive task of preparing the appropriate payment schedules, a claiming contractor or 
subcontractor is entitled to obtain a more or less default adjudication decision. 
 
It would be hard to exaggerate the importance and the difficulty of providing payment 
schedules to every single payment claim that comes in to an office.  A typical head 
contractor will receive a large number of payment claims each month, and it is extremely 
common for head contractors to fail to keep on top of the paperwork required by the 
legislation. 
 
Furthermore, if a respondent rejects a payment claim in a payment schedule, this does not 
prevent a tenacious claimant from making the same claim month after month. As noted by 
the NSW Department of Public Works and Services (2002: 21): 
  
A vexatious claimant may serve the same payment claim repeatedly over a period of 
time, with the hope that the respondent will eventually fail to serve a payment 
schedule. The claimant could then recover the full amount of the claim through court 
under s 15 of the Act. 
 
                                               
70
 Coordinated Construction Co Pty Ltd v Climatech (Canberra) Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 229 at [25].  
71
 Nepean Engineering Pty. Ltd. v. Total Process Services Pty. Ltd. (In Liquidation) [2005] NSWCA 409 at [48]. 
72
 [2008] FCA 1248 (a Victorian Case). 
73
 The „Protectavale principle‟ was also applied in Queensland in Neumann Contractors P/L v Peet Beachton 
Syndicate Limited [2009] QSC 376. 
74
 For instance, it is not a requirement of a payment schedule that a respondent breaks down the amount that he 
proposes to pay amongst all of the items claimed.  Thus, provided the respondent identifies which items he is not 
paying for in full, and says why he is not paying for them in full, he can still comply with the Act without telling the 
claimant party precisely how much he is prepared to pay in respect of which item.  
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Therefore, a respondent may have to defend the same payment claim on several occasions 
throughout the duration of the construction contract, spelling out all of the reasons on each 
occasion.75 
 
Volume of Litigation and Clarity of the Law 
As previously referred to, there have been at least 210 NSW Supreme Court judgments, and 
41 NSW Court of Appeal judgments, in relation to issues concerning the NSW Act since 
2001. The majority of these judgments represent cases where a respondent has attempted 
to have an adjudicator‟s determination, or part thereof, set aside. 
 
Principal Issue before the Court No. of Cases 
Whether payment claim (in full or in part) is valid
76
 5 
Whether a construction contract or arrangement within scope of Act exists
77
 5 
Whether plaintiff was denied natural justice and/or adjudicator failed to make a 
bona fide attempt to exercise his/her task under the Act
78
  
2 
Whether, under the Corporations Act a genuine dispute exists for an off-setting 
claim against the adjudicated amount which the claimant is trying to enforce by 
statutory demand
79
  
2 
Whether there has been an abuse of the processes under the Act
80
 1 
Whether adjudicator correctly applied s 34 of the Act to include sums in the 
adjudicated amount over and beyond an agreed sum in the contract
81
 
1 
Whether adjudicated amount should be corrected
82
 1 
Whether adjudicator was validly appointed
83
 1 
Whether damages claimed in adjudication application outside of scope of payment 
claim
84
 
1 
Whether reasons for withholding payment can be incorporated by reference into 
the payment schedule
85
 
1 
Whether payment schedule can be provided by an agent of the respondent
86
 1 
Total 21 
Table 1 Judgments of the NSW Supreme Court in 2009 with respect to applications challenging 
payment of adjudicated amount 
 
Ten years on from the commencement of the NSW Act, the numbers of such applications 
show little signs of abatement, with at least 2187 related judgments coming out of the NSW 
                                               
75
 Although, note that in Perform (NSW) Pty Ltd v MEV-AUS Pty Ltd & Anor [2009] NSWCA 157, the NSW Court 
of Appeal held that a payment schedule could indicate reasons for nil valuation by referring to previous payment 
schedule. 
76
 The Owners Strata Plan 56587 v Consolidated Quality Projects [2009] NSWSC 1476 ; Allpro Building Services 
v C&V Engineering Services [2009] NSWSC 1247; Urban Traders v Paul Michael [2009] NSWSC 1072; The 
University of Sydney v Cadence Australia Pty Limited & Anor [2009] NSWSC 635; Perform (NSW) Pty Ltd v Mev-
Aus Pty Ltd trading as Novatec Construction Systems [2009] NSWSC 416.  
77
 Parkview v Fortia [2009] NSWSC 1065; Cardiacos v Cooper Consulting & Construction Services (Aust) Pty Ltd 
[2009] NSWSC 938; Levadetes v Iberian Artisans [2009] NSWSC 641; Olbourne v Excell Building Corp Pty 
Limited [2009] NSWSC 349; Duynstee v Dickens & Dickens [2009] NSWSC 292.  
78
 Robson Civil Projects Pty Limited v Walter Mining Pty Limited [2009] NSWSC 1071; Reid v Eire [2009] 
NSWSC 678. 
79
 Project v TQM [2009] NSWSC 699; Diddy Boy v Design [2009] NSWSC 14. 
80
 Filadelfia Projects Pty Limited v EntirITy Business Services Pty Limited [2009] NSWSC 1468.   
81
 Roseville Bridge Marina Pty Ltd v Bellingham Marine Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 320.  
82
 Holdmark v Melhemcorp [2009] NSWSC 305. 
83
 Kittu Randhawa v Monica Benavides Serrato [2009] NSWSC 90.   
84
 Parkview Constructions Pty Ltd v Sydney Civil Excavations Pty Ltd & anor [2009] NSWSC 61.  
85
 Perform (NSW) Pty Ltd v Mev-Aus Pty Ltd trading as Novatec Construction Systems [2009] NSWSC 416.  
86
 Lucas Stuart v Hemmes Hermitage [2009] NSWSC 477. 
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Supreme Court in 2009.88 All of these 2009 cases for one reason or another (see Table 1 
below) sought to challenge the payment of an amount determined in adjudication. 
 
By any measure, this is a significant amount of litigation.  Furthermore, this does not include 
cases where, dissatisfied with the outcome of adjudication, a respondent has subsequently 
applied to court or arbitration to have the payment dispute finally determined. 89  This 
compares with a total of three WA Supreme Court judgments (and no WA Court of Appeal 
judgments) in relation to issues concerning the WA Act since its enactment in 2004, only 
one90 of which concerned an application to have the adjudicator‟s determination set aside.91 
Such diversity in the amount of litigation generated by the NSW and WA legislation may, 
perhaps, be reflective of respondents‟ level of dissatisfaction, and consequent lack of 
willingness to accept the adjudicator‟s decision, with the substantive and procedural justice 
afforded by each of the two models. 
 
Additionally, the significant body of NSW case law generated by the Act may be reflective of 
a lack of clarity with respect to the legislative drafting leaving many issues to be interpreted 
and given certainty by the judiciary. Hence, there has been, and still appears to be, the 
potential for respondents to argue that an adjudicator‟s determination should be set aside on 
the basis of several issues. These include issues relating to delay damages, grounds for 
reviewability of an adjudicator‟s determination, 92  payment claim reagitation or issue 
estoppel,93 information to be included on a duly submitted payment claim (Protectavale Pty 
Ltd v K2K Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1248), the scope of section 34 of the Act with respect to 
voiding contractual provisions which restrict the operation of the Act,94 and conflict between 
the Act and Federal corporations and trade practices law.95    
 
Conclusion  
A successful dispute resolution process is one that is sustainable in the context of the 
industry in which it operates. To be sustainable, the procedure and outcomes of a dispute 
resolution process need to satisfy the dispute stakeholders in order to achieve efficiency (in 
terms of time and cost) and finality. The real and/or perceived justice afforded by the dispute 
resolution process is a key factor in stakeholder satisfaction. Furthermore, an adequate 
                                                                                                                                                  
87
 This figure was obtained by conducting a search on the NSW Lawlink Case Law website 
<http//:www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/caselaw/ll_caselaw.nsf/cases/cl_sc > using the keywords “Building and 
Construction Industry Security of Payment Act”. The figure is indicative and not necessarily a fully accurate 
number of the total judgments in 2009. 
88
 Additionally, at least four judgments were made by the NSW Court of Appeal in 2009 in relation to issues 
concerning the NSW Act. 
89
 No existing data in this respect could be found. 
90
 O’Donnell Griffin Pty Ltd v John Holland Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 19 where the plaintiff applied for a writ of 
certiorari to quash the adjudicator‟s determination. 
91
 Note that a search on the WA State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) decisions database website 
<http://decisions.justice.wa.gov.au/SAT/SATdcsn.nsf> revealed that there have been 34 SAT judgments since 
the enactment of the WA Act in 2004. However, most of these judgments concern a review of an adjudicator‟s 
decision to dismiss an adjudication application without making a determination of its merits (see s 31(2)(a) & s 
46(1) of the WA Act). SAT has made it clear it will only review adjudicators‟ decisions with respect to jurisdiction, 
and that it will not review an adjudicator‟s determination on the merits – for example, see Match Projects Pty Ltd 
and Arcon (WA) Pty Ltd [2009] WASAT 134. 
92
 Musico & Ors v Davenport & Ors [2003] NSWSC 977; Brodyn Pty Limited T/as Time Cost and Quality v 
Davenport & Anor [2004] NSWCA 394; Holmwood Holdings v Halkat Electrical Contractors & Anor [2005] 
NSWSC 1129. 
93
 See Dualcorp Pty Ltd v Remo Constructions Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 69; Urban Traders v Paul Michael [2009] 
NSWSC 1072; and Filadelfia Projects Pty Limited v EntirITy Business Services Pty Limited [2009] NSWSC 1468. 
94
 See Minister for Commerce v Contrax Plumbing [2004] NSWCA 142; John Goss Projects v Leighton 
Contractors Pty Ltd & Davenport [2006] NSWSC 798; John Holland Pty Ltd v Roads and Traffic Authority of New 
South Wales[2006] NSWSC 874. 
95
 See Greenaways Australia Pty Ltd v CBC Management Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1186; Aldoga Aluminium Pty 
Limited v De Silvia Starr PTY Limited [2005] NSWSC 284; Bitannia Pty Ltd v Parkline Constructions Pty Ltd 
[2006] NSWCA 238.  
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opportunity for disputants to be heard and a belief that any third party tribunal has acted 
fairly in determining the dispute have been found to be important components of real and 
perceived justice.  
 
Accordingly, a successful construction industry payments legislative scheme needs to not 
only facilitate as far as possible the flow of cash down the contractual chain in an expedient 
manner, but be able to sustain such improved cash flow for all parties across the whole 
construction industry by maximising real and perceived justice of the scheme, minimising 
overall costs to the construction industry of settling payment disputes, and encouraging 
positive relationships between the contracting parties. 
    
Whilst the numbers of adjudication applications in the East Coast model jurisdictions have 
progressively increased to a high level since commencement of the legislation, and 
adjudication fees have been consistently low, it would appear that the legislation generates 
significant consequential administrative and legal burdens upon the construction industry. 
This is particularly evinced in the considerable resources needed by principals to prepare 
potentially numerous comprehensive payment schedules in each payment period and the 
vast amount of litigation in the NSW courts initiated by disgruntled respondents in an attempt 
to have adjudication determinations set aside. 
 
It is suggested that such administrative and legal burdens can be directly related to the lack 
of procedural and substantive justice afforded by the East Coast legislation, particularly as a 
result of the restrictions the legislation places on the rights of respondents to present their 
case in adjudication responses and the adjudicator to ascertain the facts and law beyond 
what is contained in the parties‟ submissions. Additionally, several issues arising from the 
legislative provisions have required judicial interpretation, creating both: opportunity for 
unhappy respondents to argue in court that an adjudicator‟s determination should be set 
aside; and, a lack of legal clarity for stakeholders regarding the use of the legislation.  
 
There have been substantially fewer applications to the courts in WA to have adjudicators‟ 
determinations set aside. Additionally, as the West Coast legislation gives primacy to any 
contractual interim payment scheme agreed by the parties, it does not generate the extra 
administrative burden associated with the East Coast model‟s dual payment system. Further, 
as the West Coast legislation places no restrictions on the right of either disputing party to 
present its case in adjudication, and the adjudicator may inform himself or herself about the 
dispute in any way he or she thinks fit, it is proposed that the West Coast model affords 
higher levels of procedural and substantive justice than the East Coast model. 
 
This paper is principally concerned with the Australian experience. Nevertheless, it is useful 
to compare the Australian experience with the experience overseas, and in particular that of 
the UK and NZ.  
 
The UK Model is even more evaluative than the West Coast model, in that the adjudicators 
are under a duty to exercise their initiative to ascertain the facts and the law. Before the UK 
legislation was passed by the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, the 
construction industry there was (per Latham 1993) suffering badly from a lack of trust 
engendered by the ability of paymasters to delay or evade payment with relative impunity. 
Since that legislation was implemented, there has been a considerable improvement, and all 
parties (including, importantly, head contractors) appear to regard adjudicators' decisions as 
generally fair, and the industry has benefited from much more balanced and productive 
relationships between contracting parties. Parties who have been through adjudications inter 
se have often moved on rapidly to an enhanced working relationship. Conversely, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that East Coast model adjudications are not typically perceived by both 
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parties as fair, and often lead to a total breakdown of the commercial relationship between 
the adjudicating parties. 
 
Whilst it is hoped the observations and propositions made by the authors in this article will 
provide a useful platform for debate and further discussion, it is recognised that little work 
has been done to canvass the opinions of the legislation‟s stakeholders across Australia with 
respect to levels of satisfaction with the various Acts. There is a need for such a nationwide 
survey before any firm recommendations can start to be formed as to the most appropriate 
conceptual framework and detail to be adopted in any harmonised model. As such, the 
recently conducted survey by the Society of Construction Law Australia, 96  calling for 
submissions and views from its members in relation to the current security of payment 
legislative framework and potential avenues for reform, is a step in the right direction.  
 
Addendum 
Since the preparation of this paper, the Court of Appeal in New South Wales has handed 
down its decision in Chase Oyster Bar v Hamo Industries97, in which it was decided that 
adjudication decisions in New South Wales are susceptible to court review by way of 
certiorari, and that the limits for court review are not set by the five “basic and essential 
requirements” identified in Brodyn v Davenport. Although the court did not dwell on the point, 
it seems that such certiorari challenge is not limited to challenge on the grounds of want of 
jurisdiction, and indeed Spigelman CJ found that the fatal defect in this case – a failure by 
the claimant to give notice of intention to apply for adjudication within 20 days of the due 
date for payment as required by section 17(2) of the NSW Act – was not a jurisdictional 
matter. And so perhaps challenges will be available on the other certiorari grounds98. It was 
also found that the court is not bound by findings of the adjudicator as to jurisdictional 
matters. 
 
In Victoria, the courts had come to a similar view as to the availability of certiorari99, but 
subject to the view that it would not disturb adjudicators‟ findings as to jurisdictional issues. 
The numbers of Victorian adjudications remain low, and the impact of certiorari there has 
been correspondingly slight. In Western Australia, the courts have held that certiorari is 
excluded by the terms of the WA Act. 
 
It remains to be seen what impact the Chase Oyster Bar case will have on security of 
payment cases. It appears to represent some turning of the judicial tide away from the 
legislative objective of a quick and enforceable process.  Potentially, many East Coast 
adjudications might now be susceptible to challenge on the basis of error on the face of the 
record, and this may represent a further point of distinction from its West Coast cousin.   
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